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 ON THE EXPANSION OF “WELFARE” AND “HEALTH” UNDER 
MEDICAID 
LAURA D. HERMER* 
ABSTRACT 
Medicaid was intended from its inception to provide financial access to 
health care for certain categories of impoverished Americans. While rooted in 
historical welfare programs, it was meant to afford the “deserving” poor 
access to the same sort of health care that other, wealthier Americans 
received. Yet despite this seemingly innocuous and laudable purpose, it has 
become a front in the political and social battles waged over the last several 
decades on the issues of welfare and the safety net. The latest battleground pits 
competing visions of Medicaid. One vision seeks to transform Medicaid from a 
health care program into something sharing key trappings of cash welfare 
programs. Despite the delinkage of Medicaid in most respects from cash 
welfare with the passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act of 1996, some states sought to tie access to Medicaid 
benefits to adherence to particular healthy behaviors, completion of preventive 
care measures, and assumption of increased financial responsibility. This 
trend has increased in the post-Affordable Care Act environment. A competing 
vision in states seeks to include within Medicaid’s auspices various means of 
ameliorating not merely medical problems, but also socioeconomic 
determinants of health. States taking this route are heeding data supporting the 
premise that, in order to better and more cheaply address the health care 
needs of everyone, we need to address not only financial access to health care 
but also environmental, economic, and social factors that can lead to bad 
health. I will examine these competing visions of Medicaid, and consider the 
extent to which the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services can arguably grant lawful waivers to these states for these expansions 
or constrictions. I will further consider the implications of these visions, and 
their success or failure, on Medicaid’s longer-term prospects, as well as on the 
greater health care system. 
  
 
* Professor, Mitchell Hamline School of Law, St. Paul, MN. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Most Americans believe that everyone should have health insurance. A 
Harris poll taken in the summer of 2015 found that a large majority of 
Americans believe that having a system that ensures that people who get sick 
can obtain the care they need is a moral issue, and that the United States (U.S.) 
should have a universal health care system so that everyone would have 
affordable access to medical care.1 
Yet, we do not all agree on the best way to achieve full coverage. The 
same poll, for example, found that a bare majority of respondents thought that 
“[i]t should be everybody’s personal responsibility to figure out how to get 
their health insurance, not the government’s responsibility.”2 At the same time, 
even more respondents believed that the U.S. should have universal coverage, 
and that, if other “advanced countries” had universal coverage, we could as 
well.3 
This divergence may have to do with a fundamental disagreement 
regarding why everyone should have health insurance. Is it a matter of personal 
responsibility, or collective risk-sharing? Should people have to prove to the 
rest of us that they are contributing members of society before they get 
assistance paying for the high price of coverage, or is health coverage more 
properly viewed as a precondition of being able to meaningfully contribute in 
the first place? What help, if any, should any of us get in making sure that we 
are insured? Does it matter that most of us receive substantial financial 
subsidies from the federal and state governments in the form of tax 
exemptions—the value of which rise with the more money we make—and that 
we did so for decades before the Affordable Care Act (ACA) was ever 
enacted? 
In the realm of Medicaid, these issues are being played out at the state 
level. This article will look at two different states, Indiana and Oregon, that 
have taken widely disparate approaches to the question of why people should 
have coverage, and what they should do in order to deserve it. Admittedly, 
available data is incomplete and at times scant. Moreover, there are many other 
factors besides the availability and terms of coverage that impact the factors 
under consideration here. Nevertheless, I will argue, based on the available 
data, that, of the two states, Oregon’s approach to Medicaid is not merely more 
likely to further the goals of Medicaid, but is also likelier than Indiana’s 
approach to help lead to a healthier and more productive population overall. 
 
 1. Dennis Thompson, Most Americans View Access to Health Care as a Moral Issue, 
HARRIS POLL (Sept. 8, 2015), http://www.theharrispoll.com/politics/Health-Care-Moral-
Issue.html. 
 2. Id.; Gallup has found similar results. Healthcare System, GALLUP (2016), http://www.gal 
lup.com/poll/4708/healthcare-system.aspx?version=print. 
 3. Thompson, supra note 1. 
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II.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF SECTION 1115 MEDICAID WAIVERS 
Medicaid is a cooperative federal-state public program that provides health 
care to certain low-income Americans.4 Generally, the federal government sets 
the baseline terms for the program and is responsible for overseeing the 
compliance with those terms by state Medicaid programs.5 State governments 
generally determine the shape and form of their Medicaid programs within the 
confines set by the federal government, administer their programs, and request 
waivers from certain federal requirements where they deem such to be 
desirable.6 
Because of its hybrid nature, federal law already gives states a certain 
amount of discretion in designing and implementing their Medicaid programs.7 
The potential availability of waivers under Section 1115 otherwise expands 
this discretion substantially.8 The law authorizing Section 1115 waivers 
predates the Medicaid program.9 Section 1115 gives the Secretary of the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) broad discretion to waive 
requirements set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1396a at a state’s request, in order to test 
an “experimental, pilot, or demonstration project which, in the judgment of the 
Secretary, is likely to assist in promoting the objectives of [the Medicaid 
Act].”10 Such waivers are supposed to be “budget neutral;” in other words, 
they are not supposed to increase programmatic costs beyond what the state’s 
Medicaid program would have spent in the absence of the waiver.11 
 
 4. Medicaid, MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid-chip-program-informa 
tion/medicaid-and-chip-program-information.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2016). 
 5. Id.; see also Federal Policy Guidance, MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/feder 
al-policy-guidance/federal-policy-guidance.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2016). 
 6. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(1), 1396a(kk)(1)-(3) (2012). Section 1396a addresses general 
programmatic requirements for state Medicaid programs, ranging from a state Medicaid 
program’s geographic coverage to provider and supplier screening, oversight, and reporting 
requirements within the program. Id. 
 7. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (2012). 
 8. 42 U.S.C. § 1315a(d)(1) (2012). 
 9. Waivers, MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMMISSION (2015), 
https://www.macpac.gov/subtopic/waivers/. Section 1115 was added to the Social Security Act in 
1962. Lucy A. Williams, The Abuse of Section 1115 Waivers: Welfare Reform in Search of a 
Standard, 12 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 8, 10 (1994). 
 10. See Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74–271, § 1115, 49 Stat. 620 (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a) (2012)). Such requirements include, e.g., rules involving premiums and 
cost sharing by beneficiaries (42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(14) (2012)), beneficiary freedom of choice of 
providers (42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23)(A) (2012)), and timing of initial enrollment (42 U.S.C. §§ 
1396a(a)(8) & (34) (2012)). 
 11. This requirement is not provided in the statute, but rather is based on longstanding HHS 
policy. See e.g., Medicaid Program; Demonstration Proposals Pursuant to Section 1115(a) of the 
Social Security Act; Policies and Procedures, 59 Fed. Reg. (Sept. 27, 1994), https://www.gpo.gov 
/fdsys/pkg/FR-1994-09-27/html/94-23808.htm [hereinafter Medicaid Program; Demonstration 
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Waivers were used relatively sparingly in the context of Medicaid until the 
early 1990s, and usually only addressed limited populations or geographic 
regions within a state.12 This changed in the 1990s during the Clinton era.13 
The General Accounting Office (now the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO)) found in 1995 that twenty-two states sought waivers in the preceding 
three years, primarily to move from a fee-for-service to a managed care 
delivery system, and to use anticipated savings from the transition to cover 
previously uninsured populations.14 Cost-containment was a primary objective 
of these waivers, one that has often remained a feature, to a greater or lesser 
degree, of such applications to the present date.15 
The Administration of President George W. Bush encouraged states to 
become more creative in their waiver plans, and sought greater use of private 
coverage in the process. In 2001, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) invited states to participate in its Health Insurance Flexibility 
and Accountability (HIFA) program.16 This Section 1115 waiver initiative 
focused on expanding coverage, often through private means, to individuals 
earning less than 200% of the federal poverty level (FPL), ostensibly without 
the expenditure of any new funds.17 Because the expansions were, as per 
longstanding policy, supposed to be budget neutral, the administration 
 
Proposals] (noting that “[t]he Department’s fiduciary obligations in a period of extreme budgetary 
stringency require maintenance of the principle of cost neutrality”). 
 12. The GAO notes that Oregon’s 1991 Section 1115 Medicaid waiver application was the 
first that the federal government had received in ten years. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
GAO/HEHS-96-44, MEDICAID SECTION 1115 WAIVERS: FLEXIBLE APPROACH TO APPROVING 
DEMONSTRATIONS COULD INCREASE FEDERAL COSTS 25, 25 nn.30, 31 (1995), http://www.gao. 
gov/assets/160/155296.pdf [hereinafter GAO/HEHS-96-44]. Once applications started coming in, 
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) issued rules for the use of such waivers 
in the Medicaid program. See generally Medicaid Program; Demonstration Proposals, supra note 
11. 
 13. Saundra K. Schneider, Medicaid Section 1115 Waivers: Shifting Health Care Reform to 
the States, 27 PUBLIUS 89, 99 (1997); Paul Richter, Clinton Orders Easier Medicaid Rules for 
States, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1993. 
 14. GAO/HEHS-96-44, supra note 12, at 13. 
 15. See generally id. The Ninth Circuit, at least, has suggested that cost containment is not, 
on its own, a sufficient basis for the Secretary to grant a Section 1115 waiver. Newton-Nations v. 
Betlach, 660 F.3d 370, 381, 383 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057, 1069 
(9th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he Secretary’s obligation under § 1315 to ‘make some judgment that the 
project has a research or a demonstration value’ cannot be satisfied by ‘[a] simple benefits cut, 
which might save money, but has no research or experimental goal.’”). 
 16. President George W. Bush, President Announces Medicaid Reform in Weekly Radio 
Address, THE WHITE HOUSE (Aug. 4, 2001), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/ 
releases/2001/08/20010804.html. 
 17. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, USING MEDICAID DOLLARS TO 
COVER THE UNINSURED (2008), http://www.dhcs.ca.gov/provgovpart/Documents/Waiver%20Re 
newal/All%20States%20Chart.pdf. 
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permitted states to increase cost-sharing amounts for optional populations, 
obtain funding from employers and nonprofits, and—at least initially—to use 
unspent State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP)18 funds.19 They 
could also offer different benefit packages than the standard Medicaid benefit 
package to the expansion population.20 
Multiple states took up the Administration’s invitation to experiment with 
their Medicaid programs, whether through the HIFA initiative or otherwise. By 
the end of the Bush Administration, at least fifteen HIFA waivers had been 
approved, and at least forty-three states had at least one active Section 1115 
Medicaid waiver.21 These waivers were used for a wide variety of purposes, 
including the privatization of Medicaid coverage in certain regions of a state,22 
creating a single, state-run managed care organization,23 requiring certain 
 
 18. After the GAO spent years questioning the use of SCHIP funds (now CHIP funds) to 
cover adults, Congress eventually restricted the use of SCHIP funds to coverage of children and 
fetuses. Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-3, § 
112, 123 Stat. 8, 29 (2009) (codified as enacted at 42 U.S.C. § 1397kk(a) (2012)); see also, e.g., 
Letter from Kathryn Allen, Dir., Health Care, U.S. Gov’t Accounting Office, to Senators Charles 
Grassley and Max Baucus, (Jan. 5, 2004), http://www.gao.gov/assets/100/92413.pdf. 
The legal and policy concerns that we raised in our July 2002 report remain: HHS 
continues to approve waivers allowing states to use SCHIP to fund health insurance 
coverage for childless adults, despite SCHIP’s statutory objective of expanding coverage 
to low-income children. We believe that these approvals are inconsistent with SCHIP’s 
goals because they allow SCHIP funds to be diverted from the needs of low-income 
children. In the absence of congressional clarification of whether SCHIP funds may be 
used to cover parents and guardians of Medicaid- or SCHIP-eligible children without 
regard to cost-effectiveness, we also question HHS’s approval of additional waiver 
proposals for such coverage. 
Id. 
 19. See generally CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., APPLICATION TEMPLATE FOR 
INSURANCE FLEXIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY (HIFA) § 1115 DEMONSTRATION PROPOSAL 
(2001). 
 20. See, e.g., id. at 5-6 (listing the different alternate benefit packages available for optional 
and expansion populations). 
 21. Adam Atherly et al., The Effect of HIFA Waiver Expansions on Uninsurance Rates in 
Adult Populations, 47 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 939, 941-43 (2012); see NAT’L CONFERENCE OF 
STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 17. 
 22. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., FLORIDA MANAGED MEDICAL 
ASSISTANCE DEMONSTRATION SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS 2 (2015), https://www.medi 
caid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/fl/fl-medi 
caid-reform-ca.pdf (noting that “The Florida Medicaid Reform demonstration was approved 
October 19, 2005. The state implemented the demonstration July 1, 2006, in Broward and Duval 
Counties, and then expanded to Baker, Clay, and Nassau Counties July 1, 2007.”). 
 23. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., VERMONT GLOBAL COMMITMENT TO 
HEALTH DEMONSTRATION SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS 2 (2015), https://www.medicaid. 
gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/vt/vt-global-com 
mitment-to-health-ca.pdf [hereinafter VERMONT] (noting that “The Global Commitment to 
Health Section 1115(a) demonstration was initiated in September 2005, and is designed to use a 
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Medicaid beneficiaries to adhere to “personal responsibility” pledges or else 
forfeit certain benefits,24 and extending private coverage to childless adults on 
the condition, among others, that beneficiaries contribute a set percentage of 
their income in a medical spending account,25 complete a health needs 
assessment in order to match beneficiaries to different private managed care 
plans,26 or receive only a limited ambulatory benefit package.27 
 
multi-disciplinary approach including the basic principles of public health, the fundamentals of 
effective administration of a Medicaid managed care delivery system, public-private partnership, 
and program flexibility.”). 
 24. See, e.g., NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, REDESIGNING MEDICAID USING 
THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT 6 (2007), http://www.nasbo.org/sites/default/files/Issue%20Brief_ 
DRA_091807.pdf. 
The most unique aspect of West Virginia’s new plan is the member agreement, which 
adults must sign in order to have themselves or their children moved from the Basic Plan 
to the Enhanced Plan. The member agreement, or personal responsibility contract, 
includes broad responsibilities for individuals as well as beneficiary rightsFalse If the 
state determines an individual has not met his or her responsibilities after one year of 
enrollment, the individual or the child will be moved to the Basic Plan and must wait 12 
months to qualify for reenrollment in the Enhanced Plan. 
Id. 
 25. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS: 
HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN 1, 2 (2010), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Infor 
mation/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/in/Healthy-Indiana-Plan-HIP/in-healthy-indiana-
plan-stc-01012008-12312012-amended-012010.pdf [hereinafter HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN]. 
The HIP provides a high-deductible health plan and an account styled like a health 
savings account called a POWER Account to uninsured adults including low-income 
custodial parents and caretaker relatives of Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance 
program (CHIP) children and uninsured non-custodial parents and childless adults. 
Participation in HIP is voluntary, but all enrollees will be required to receive medical care 
through the high deductible health plans POWER Accounts. 
Id. 
 26. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-384, MEDICAID 
DEMONSTRATION WAIVERS: APPROVAL PROCESS RAISES COST CONCERNS AND LACKS 
TRANSPARENCY 46-47 (2013), http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/655483.pdf [hereinafter GAO-13-
384] (noting that “The program included a variety of features: a requirement for participants to 
complete a health needs assessment—used to match enrollees with health maintenance 
organizations and providers that meet the individual’s specific health care needs . . . .”). 
 27. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS: 
PRIMARY CARE NETWORK DEMONSTRATION, UTAH 7 (2002), http://www.health.utah.gov/pcn/ 
pdf/Special%20Terms%20&%20Conditions.pdf; CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
HEALTHY MICHIGAN SECTION 1115 DEMONSTRATION FACT SHEET (2010), https://www.medi 
caid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/mi/mi-
healthy-michigan-fs.pdf. 
Prior to its amendment to authorize Healthy Michigan, the demonstration provided federal 
financial participation for the Adult Benefit Waiver (ABW) program, ABW provides a 
limited ambulatory benefit package to previously uninsured, low-income non-pregnant 
childless adults ages 19 through 64 years with incomes at or below 35 percent of the FPL 
who are not eligible for Medicaid. The ABW program was first approved in January 2004 
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The Obama Administration quietly let the HIFA waiver initiative 
disappear, and initially seemed intent on curbing some of the arguable excesses 
of Section 1115 waivers under the Bush Administration, ones that became “a 
substitute for rulemaking or way to circumvent the law,” or that “push[ed] 
states into compromising financing arrangements.”28 Certain public-private 
partnerships in the Medicaid program continued under the Obama 
Administration prior to the enactment of the ACA, but it appeared that they 
would no longer be favored for their own sake as they were under the Bush 
Administration.29 
Additionally and notably, the ACA made significant changes in the way 
that Section 1115 Medicaid waivers would be evaluated. The GAO and various 
stakeholders had complained for years about the waiver process’s lack of 
transparency and public input.30 Accordingly, the ACA required the Secretary 
to promulgate regulations putting in place “a process for public notice and 
comment . . . sufficient to ensure a meaningful level of public input” both 
before the state submits, and after the Secretary receives, a waiver application; 
requirements regarding project goals, state and federal costs, and state 
implementation plans; and a process for reporting on and evaluating the 
demonstration project.31 CMS also posted the general criteria that it uses to 
determine whether Medicaid’s objectives are being met.32 Additionally, it has 
 
as a title XXI funded Health Insurance Flexibility and Accountability (HIFA) [S]ection 
1115 demonstration. 
Id. 
 28. Cindy Mann & Tim Westmoreland, Attending to Medicaid, 32 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 
416, 422 (2004). 
 29. See, e.g., Letter from Carolyn L. Yocom, U.S. Gen. Accountability Office, to Senators 
Charles Grassley, Max Baucus, & Henry A. Waxman, & Representative Joe Barton (Jan. 19, 
2010), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10258r.pdf. 
 30. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-817, MEDICAID AND SCHIP: 
RECENT HHS APPROVALS OF DEMONSTRATION WAIVER PROJECTS RAISE CONCERNS 2-4 
(2002), http://www.gao.gov/assets/240/235107.pdf; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-
480, MEDICAID WAIVERS: HHS APPROVALS OF PHARMACY PLUS DEMONSTRATIONS CONTINUE 
TO RAISE COST AND OVERSIGHT CONCERNS 2 (2004), http://www.gao.gov/assets/250/2432 
86.pdf; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-694R, MEDICAID DEMONSTRATION 
WAIVERS: LACK OF OPPORTUNITY FOR PUBLIC INPUT DURING FEDERAL APPROVAL PROCESS 
STILL A CONCERN 2 (2007), http://www.gao.gov/assets/100/95034.pdf; U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-694R, MEDICAID DEMONSTRATION WAIVERS: RECENT 
HHS APPROVALS CONTINUE TO RAISE COST AND OVERSIGHT CONCERNS 7 (2008), 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/280/271789.pdf; GAO-13-384, supra note 26, at 2. 
 31. Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74–271, § 1115(d), 49 Stat. 620 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 1315(d) (2012)). 
 32. Those criteria are whether the proposed demonstration will: 
[I]ncrease and strengthen overall coverage of low-income individuals in the state; increase 
access to, stabilize, and strengthen providers and provider networks available to serve 
Medicaid and low-income populations in the state; improve health outcomes for Medicaid 
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sought to standardize the waiver process by promulgating a standardized 
waiver template and budget neutrality calculation form, and by more clearly 
laying out standards for independent evaluation of project outcomes.33 
III.  SECTION 1115 MEDICAID WAIVERS AFTER NATIONAL FEDERATION OF 
INDEPENDENT BUSINESSES V. SEBELIUS 
The direction the Obama Administration would have taken, over time, on 
its own accord regarding Section 1115 waivers will never quite be known 
because of the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in National Federation of 
Independent Businesses (NFIB) v. Sebelius. NFIB v. Sebelius tilted the balance 
of power in Medicaid waiver decisions from the federal to certain state 
governments by making the ACA’s Medicaid expansion optional rather than 
mandatory.34 Just over half of the states initially refused to expand Medicaid to 
all adults earning up to 133% FPL under the terms of the ACA.35 They would 
only agree to expand Medicaid, if at all, if CMS waived certain programmatic 
conditions.36 Many of these conditions both track and extend prior efforts by 
 
and other low-income populations in the state; or increase the efficiency and quality of 
care for Medicaid and other low-income populations through initiatives to transform 
service delivery networks. 
Section 1115 Demonstrations, MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid-chip-pro 
gram-information/by-topics/waivers/1115/section-1115-demonstrations.html (last visited Mar. 
21, 2016). 
 33. See Letter from Cindy Mann, Dir., Ctr. for Medicaid & CHIP Servs., to State Medicaid 
Dir. & State Health Official (Apr. 27, 2012), https://www.medicaid.gov/federal-policy-guid 
ance/downloads/sho-12-001.pdf [hereinafter CMS, State Medicaid Letter]; CTRS. FOR MEDICARE 
& MEDICAID SERVS., SECTION 1115 DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM TEMPLATE, https://www.medi 
caid.gov/medicaid-chip-program-information/by-topics/waivers/1115/downloads/fillable-1115-
demo-10-12v2.pdf. 
 34. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2566 (2012). 
Nothing in our opinion precludes Congress from offering funds under the Affordable Care 
Act to expand the availability of health care, and requiring that all States accepting such 
funds comply with the conditions on their use. What Congress is not free to do is to 
penalize States that choose not to participate in that new program by taking away their 
existing Medicaid funding. Section 1396c gives the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services the authority to do just that.  It allows her to withhold all ‘further [Medicaid] 
payments . . . to the State’ if she determines that the State is out of compliance with any 
Medicaid requirement, including those contained in the expansion. 42 U.S.C. § 1396c. In 
light of the Court’s holding, the Secretary cannot apply § 1396 to withdraw existing 
Medicaid funds for failure to comply with the requirements set out in the expansion. 
Id. at 2607. 
 35. Id. at 2572, 2629. 
 36. See, e.g., MARYBETH MUSUMECI & ROBIN RUDOWITZ, THE ACA AND MEDICAID 
EXPANSION WAIVERS 1 (2015), http://files.kff.org/attachment/issue-brief-the-aca-and-medicaid-
expansion-waivers (noting that, as of November 2015, six out of the thirty-one states participating 
in the expansion had received waivers through which they planned to implement their expansion, 
and one state, Pennsylvania, had previously sought and obtained an expansion waiver but had 
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some right-leaning states to make Medicaid look and feel more like private 
coverage, and to institute “personal responsibility” requirements.37 Not 
wanting to leave the poorest residents of those states with no secure access to 
Medicaid coverage, the Obama Administration ultimately acquiesced to waiver 
features that it might otherwise never have contemplated granting. 
As states that initially balked at implementing the Medicaid expansion 
slowly and ultimately contemplate taking up the expansion, the concessions 
extracted from CMS have grown. Initially, Arkansas sought and obtained 
approval in September 2013 for its “private option” expansion,38 which 
extends at least two qualified health plans (QHPs) in the “Silver” tier available 
through state Exchanges to adults—other than “medically frail” adults and 
Native Americans—in the expansion population, and provides wrap-around 
Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment (EPSDT) coverage 
for individuals ages nineteen and twenty.39 The state pays the individual’s 
premium on the individual’s behalf.40 The following year, Arkansas sought 
and obtained amendments to use a state-run system of non-emergency 
transportation for the expansion population and, notably, to institute a system 
of “Independence Accounts” into which the expansion population members 
earning between fifty percent and 133% FPL must contribute.41 If beneficiaries 
fail to make the required contributions, then they must pay cost-sharing 
amounts out-of-pocket at the point of service, and providers may deny services 
 
abandoned it in favor of the standard expansion mechanism when the state elected a new 
governor). 
 37. See, e.g., Laura D. Hermer, Personal Responsibility: A Plausible Social Goal, but Not 
for Medicaid Reform, 38 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 16, 16 (2008); Laura D. Hermer, Medicaid, Low 
Income Pools, and the Goals of Privatization, 17 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 405-06 (2010) 
[hereinafter Hermer, Medicaid]. 
 38. Letter from Eliot Fishman, Dir., State Demonstrations Grp., to John Selig, Dir., Ark. 
Dep’t of Human Servs. (Aug. 14, 2015), http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-In 
formation/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/ar/ar-private-option-ca.pdf. 
 39. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS: 
ARKANSAS HEALTH CARE INDEPENDENCE PROGRAM (PRIVATE OPTION) 9-10, 13, 14 (2015), 
http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/down 
loads/ar/ar-private-option-ca.pdf [hereinafter ARKANSAS HC INDEPENDENCE PROGRAM]. 
 40. Id. at 11. 
 41. Letter from Marilyn Tavenner, Adm’r, Ctrs. For Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to John 
Selig., Dir., Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. (Dec. 31, 2014); ARKANSAS HC INDEPENDENCE 
PROGRAM, supra note 39, at 15-17. Individuals earning between fifty percent and 100% FPL 
must contribute at least five dollars per month to their Independence Account; those earning 
between 100% and 133% FPL must contribute between ten and twenty-five dollars, on a sliding 
scale. Id. at 16-17. If beneficiaries fail to make the required contributions, then they must pay 
cost-sharing amounts out of pocket at the point of service, and individuals making more than 
100% FPL may be denied services. Id. at 18. Funds in the account may be used for cost-sharing 
amounts or premium payments for QHPs if the individual becomes ineligible for Medicaid. Id. at 
6 (Attachment C). 
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to them.42 According to its own terms, the waiver is intended to promote 
continuity of care by smoothing out the effects of churning between Medicaid 
and private coverage; improve reimbursement rates for providers and 
accordingly improving access to care by reimbursing providers at market rates 
rather than Medicaid rates; and promote beneficiary responsibility by making 
them contribute to the cost of their care as a condition of enrollment.43 
These three goals are common features of many expansion state plans. 
Iowa, Indiana, Michigan, and New Hampshire provide premium assistance for 
QHPs or other coverage to part or all of the Medicaid expansion population.44 
With the exception of New Hampshire, these states require many beneficiaries, 
even in some cases those earning less than 100% FPL, to pay premiums or 
other forms of financial contribution.45 Iowa and New Hampshire pay 
providers private coverage rates for services provided through a QHP.46 Iowa 
 
 42. ARKANSAS HC INDEPENDENCE PROGRAM, supra note 39, at 2. 
 43. Id. at 3. 
 44. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., WAIVER LIST: IOWA MARKETPLACE 
CHOICE PLAN SECTION 1115 DEMONSTRATION IOWA 1 (2015), http://www.medicaid.gov/Medi 
caid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/ia/ia-marketplace-choice-
plan-ca.pdf [hereinafter IOWA WAIVER LIST]; CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS: IOWA MARKETPLACE CHOICE PLAN 1 (2015), 
http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/down 
loads/ia/ia-marketplace-choice-plan-ca.pdf [hereinafter IOWA CHOICE PLAN]; CTRS. FOR 
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS, INDIANA SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS 9 (2015), 
https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/down 
loads/in/Healthy-Indiana-Plan-2/in-healthy-indiana-plan-support-20-ca.pdf [hereinafter HEALTHY 
INDIANA PLAN 2.0]; CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., SPECIAL TERMS AND 
CONDITIONS: NEW HAMPSHIRE HEALTH PROTECTION PROGRAM PREMIUM ASSISTANCE 2 
(2015), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/11 
15/downloads/nh/nh-health-protection-program-premium-assistance-ca.pdf [hereinafter NEW 
HAMPSHIRE HEALTH PROTECTION PROGRAM]; CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS: HEALTHY MICHIGAN SECTION 1115 DEMONSTRATION 8 
(2015), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/11 
15/downloads/mi/mi-healthy-michigan-ca.pdf [hereinafter HEALTHY MICHIGAN]. Michigan will 
start providing the expansion population earning over 100% FPL with the opportunity to choose a 
QHP rather than the Medicaid plan starting in 2018. Id. at 3. 
 45. IOWA CHOICE PLAN, supra note 44, at 8; HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN, supra note 25, at 17-
18; HEALTHY MICHIGAN, supra note 44, at 12-13. If Arizona’s proposed waiver is granted, then 
it too will join this list, as it proposes to charge all non-disabled adults between eighteen and 
sixty-four without dependent children a premium amount equal to two percent of their income or 
twenty-five dollars per month, whichever is less. DOUGLAS E. DUCEY, ARIZ. HEALTH CARE 
COST CONTAINMENT SYS., ARIZONA’S APPLICATION FOR A NEW SECTION 1115 
DEMONSTRATION 5-6 (2015), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/ 
By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/az/az-hccc-pa2.pdf. 
 46. IOWA WAIVER LIST, supra note 44, at 2; NEW HAMPSHIRE HEALTH PROTECTION 
PROGRAM, supra note 44, at 2. Presumably Michigan will as well once that program goes into 
effect. HEALTHY MICHIGAN, supra note 44, at 13. Indiana used to pay providers Medicare rates 
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and Indiana require members of the expansion population earning at least 
100% FPL to contribute to either premium or cost-sharing accounts, or else be 
disenrolled.47 
These features, among others, are quite different than anything one would 
find within the traditional parameters of Medicaid. Medicaid is a program for 
impoverished Americans who typically have minimal, if any, access to health 
insurance, and as such, has traditionally shielded beneficiaries from premium 
payments, cost-sharing, and other requirements.48 A majority of states do make 
use of private managed care plans in their Medicaid programs, but omit many 
key features commonly found in such plans when offered on the private 
market. They must include certain benefits, such as non-emergency medical 
transportation, that private market plans do not cover.49 If they charge 
premiums at all, states may charge them only to beneficiaries earning at least 
150% FPL.50 Cost-sharing must be “nominal,” if imposed at all, for 
beneficiaries earning up to 100% FPL.51 For those earning between 100% and 
150% FPL, cost-sharing amounts are limited to no more than ten percent of the 
cost of a given item or service, and, in aggregate over the course of a month or 
quarter, no more than five percent of the family’s income.52 States do not 
require “prepayment” of such costs into a health spending account, to the 
extent they charge them at all in their traditional Medicaid program, nor do 
they penalize beneficiaries for failing to make such prepayments.53 They do 
not require beneficiaries to seek and obtain certain forms of health care, such 
as preventive and/or dental services, nor penalize them for failing to do so.54 
 
under the first iteration of Healthy Indiana Plan (HIP), but now pays only about seventy-five 
percent of Medicare rates. See, e.g., IND. HEALTH COVERAGE PROGRAMS BULLETIN, IHCP 
ANNOUNCES PHYSICIAN REIMBURSEMENT RATE INCREASES WITH HIP 2.0 IMPLEMENTATION 
(Jan. 27, 2015), www.indianamedicaid.com/ihcp/Bulletins/BT201504.pdf. 
 47. IOWA CHOICE PLAN, supra note 44, at 2. If beneficiaries complete the required “healthy 
behaviors” within the relevant time periods, however, they will not be subject to premium 
payments. Id. at 17; HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN, supra note 25, at 24. Indiana also imposes a 
twenty five dollar fee for non-emergent use of emergency departments under most circumstances 
after the first such usage each year. Id. at 27. Arizona’s waiver proposal also would disenroll 
members under such circumstances. DUCEY, supra note 45, at 75. 
 48. Medicaid, supra note 4. 
 49. 42 C.F.R. § 440.170(a) (2015); 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(70) (2012). 
 50. 42 U.S.C. § 1396o(c)(1) (2012). Most children, pregnant women, terminally ill 
individuals, individuals living in an institution who are required to spend nearly all their income 
on the cost of their care, certain women with breast or cervical cancer, certain disabled children, 
and Native Americans are exempt from having to pay premiums. See id. § 1396o-1(b)(3). 
 51. Id. § 1396o-1(a)(2). 
 52. Id. § 1396o-1(b)(1). 
 53. For penalties that may be imposed on certain populations for failing to pay premiums 
and/or cost-sharing, see id. § 1396o-1(d). 
 54. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396d(a)(10), 1396d(a)(13) (2012). 
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They are strictly limited in the amount they may charge beneficiaries as a co-
payment for obtaining non-emergency care in an emergency department.55 
Mindful of the public purse, they also typically reimburse providers, especially 
physicians, at substantially lower than private market rates for services 
provided under state Medicaid programs.56 
What difference, if any, do these variances between traditional Medicaid 
and private market plans make? Do they make traditional Medicaid 
beneficiaries less mindful of the amount of care they use, or do they have little 
impact in that respect? Do they make it easier for traditional Medicaid 
beneficiaries to keep their coverage, as long as they remain eligible for the 
program, or is there little quantifiable evidence of their effect in that regard? Is 
there any difference in health outcomes between individuals enrolled in one 
versus the other type of plan? Does the provision of coverage with private 
market trappings make recipients more likely to eschew cash welfare 
programs, remain employed, keep their medical appointments, and be 
otherwise respectable members of society than their peers with traditional 
Medicaid coverage? How, if at all, do these outcomes differ between states 
utilizing one of the two different types of approaches? 
Before we move on to address these questions, I would like to introduce a 
different collection of waiver programs, one that takes a different philosophy 
toward Medicaid coverage. This group is not as amenable to pigeonholing as 
the last. However, one can argue that, rather than the “welfare” approach of the 
last group, this one takes more of a “public health” approach to Medicaid. 
None of the states in this group have sought their waivers as a condition of 
participating in the ACA’s Medicaid expansion. Instead, they have, for the 
most part, taken an expansive approach to health coverage that predates the 
ACA, in many cases on the theory that, because federal health reform, pre-
ACA, seemed unlikely to occur, they should work on reforming their own 
coverage systems as best as possible. Following enactment of the ACA, some 
states have continued with this project and are using or seeking to use Section 
1115 Medicaid waivers in the process. These states include Vermont,57 
California,58 and Oregon.59 
 
 55. 42 U.S.C. § 1396o-1(e). 
 56. See, e.g., Medicaid-to-Medicare Fee Index, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (2012), http://kff.org/ 
medicaid/state-indicator/medicaid-to-medicare-fee-index/. Medicare rates typically are lower than 
private market rates. See Cristina Boccuti & Marilyn Moon, Comparing Medicare and Private 
Insurers: Growth Rates in Spending Over Three Decades, 22 HEALTH AFF. 230, 230 (2003). 
 57. See generally CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., VERMONT SECTION 1115 
DEMONSTRATION FACT SHEET (2015), http://www.aucd.org/docs/policy/hcbs/vt-global-commit 
ment-to-health-fs.pdf. 
 58. See generally CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., CALIFORNIA BRIDGE TO 
REFORM SECTION 1115 DEMONSTRATION FACT SHEET (2015), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medi 
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While these states’ waiver programs are quite different, there are a number 
of common features to them. Foremost, they are seeking a more unified and 
systematic approach that extends coverage to as many of their residents as 
possible.60 They are creating integrated health care delivery systems that take a 
holistic approach to patient needs.61 These systems go beyond encouraging 
changes to delivery systems by paying for outcomes rather than services, for 
example. Rather, they often expressly utilize medical home-based models and 
include coverage for non-traditional services such as child care, housing and 




 59. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS: 
OREGON HEALTH PLAN 5 (2012), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Informa 
tion/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/or/or-health-plan2-ca.pdf [hereinafter OREGON HEALTH 
PLAN]. 
 60. See CAL. DEP’T OF HEALTH CARE SERVS., MEDI-CAL 2020: KEY CONCEPTS FOR 
RENEWAL 4, 30-34 (2015), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By 
Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/ca/ca-bridge-to-health-reform-pa.pdf [hereinafter CAL. DEP’T 
OF HEALTH CARE SERVS.]. California is presently seeking to reform its Medicaid 
disproportionate share hospital program (DSH), which provides federal and state funding to 
hospitals that care for a disproportionately large share of uninsured and Medicaid patients. Id. 
DSH funds have often been provided in many states with few strings attached. Id. California, 
however, is proposing to disburse DSH funds under a “global payment” system which would 
direct care for the remaining uninsured population to designated public hospitals that would 
receive a set budget within which to provide a set list of services to them. Id. But see, e.g., 
Soumya Karlamangla, Civil Rights Complaint Filed Against Medi-Cal, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 15, 
2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-civil-rights-complaint-filed-against-medi-
cal-20151213-story.html (reporting on a complaint that several California civil rights 
organizations filed with the federal Department of Health and Human Services, complaining that 
reimbursement rates are so low that beneficiaries cannot access care). Oregon has sought a more 
rational and cost-effective approach over the last few decades to health care in order, in part, to 
extend coverage to a greater portion of the state’s population. OREGON HEALTH PLAN, supra note 
59, at 5-7. In addition to covering the expansion population and others through its Global 
Commitment to Health waiver, Vermont is also providing additional subsidies to Vermonters 
earning less than 300% FPL to purchase coverage on the state Exchange. VERMONT, supra note 
23, at 2. 
 61. CAL. DEP’T OF HEALTH CARE SERVS., supra note 60, at 5; VERMONT, supra note 23, at 
32; OREGON HEALTH PLAN, supra note 59, at 7. 
 62. CAL. DEP’T OF HEALTH CARE SERVS., supra note 60, at 27-28. Oregon has been 
instituting Patient-Centered Primary Care Homes intended to not only manage and coordinate 
members’ health care services but also provide individual and family support services provided 
by community health workers, peer support and wellness specialists, doulas, and others. OREGON 
HEALTH PLAN, supra note 59, at 19, 22, 26. Vermont’s Blueprint for Health Model takes a 
community-based approach to health. See STATE OF VT. AGENCY OF HUMAN SERVS., 
QUARTERLY REPORT FOR THE PERIOD JANUARY 1, 2015-MARCH 31, 2015 16-17 (2015), 
https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/down 
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programs are also taking a more expansive approach to population health, 
under the theory that health care, as traditionally conceived, plays only one 
part in achieving the larger goal of ensuring that people have access to the 
conditions necessary to lead healthy lives.63 They typically do so, moreover, 
without requiring beneficiaries to pay additional premiums or cost-sharing for 
services, and without imposing other “personal responsibility” requirements.64 
Expanding coverage while improving population health within the 
resource constraints of state Medicaid programs, particularly given the federal 
policy of requiring budget neutrality for waiver programs, may appear to be a 
daunting task, particularly without requiring funding from additional sources, 
such as from the beneficiaries themselves. But as we will see, it may in fact be 
less costly to take the population health approach espoused by states such as 
Vermont, California, and Oregon, than it is to take the approach championed 
by states such as Indiana, Iowa, and Michigan. Additionally, to the extent data 
is available, health and other outcomes for programs such as Oregon’s are 
better than those of programs such as Indiana’s. 
IV.  THE HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN 2.0 
Governor Mike Pence of Indiana had no intention of participating in the 
ACA’s Medicaid expansion under the terms given in the ACA when he took 
office in 2013.65 At the time, the state had a program covering traditional 
Medicaid eligibility categories.66 It additionally covered an expansion 
population under the “Healthy Indiana” Plan (HIP), a Section 1115 waiver 
granted by the second Bush Administration at the end of 2007.67 HIP allowed 
the State to extend private coverage of a relatively broad range of health care 
 
loads/vt/Global-Commitment-to-Health/vt-global-commitment-to-health-qtrly-rpt-jan-mar-
2015.pdf [hereinafter VERMONT QUARTERLY REPORT]. 
 63. Thus, for example, California is proposing to use Medicaid funds to cover services 
intended to help at-risk beneficiaries to stay in their homes or to secure stable housing. CAL. 
DEP’T OF HEALTH CARE SERVS., supra note 60, at 24-26. Oregon’s Coordinated Care 
Organizations are charged with taking a population-health approach to health care. See OREGON 
HEALTH PLAN, supra note 59, at 5, 7, 26 (referencing Section VII of the plan relating to 
measurement of quality care and access to care). 
 64. See CAL. DEP’T OF HEALTH CARE SERVS., supra note 60, at 3; OREGON HEALTH PLAN, 
supra note 59 at 10, 19; VERMONT QUARTERLY REPORT, supra note 62, at 4. 
 65. Maureen Groppe Star & Mary Beth Schneider, Expansion is a Bad Idea, Say Daniels, 
Pence, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, June 29, 2012, at A1. Mitch Daniels, the governor at the time of the 
decision in 2012, was leaving office and left the decision regarding expansion to the incoming 
governor. Id. 
 66. See Hermer, Medicaid, supra note 37, at 419. 
 67. IND. FAMILY & SOC. SERVS. ADMIN., HIP HEALTHY INDIANA PLANSM HEALTH 
COVERAGE = PEACE OF MIND 4 (2014), http://www.in.gov/fssa/hip/files/HIP_Waiver_Renewal 
_(Final_6_30_14).pdf. 
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benefits to a small, capped number of the State’s uninsured adult population 
who did not otherwise qualify for Medicaid.68 
In February 2013, Governor Pence initially proposed a mere extension of 
HIP.69 He wrote in his letter to then-Secretary Sebelius: 
Medicaid is broken. It has a well-documented history of substantial waste, 
fraud and abuse. It has failed to keep pace with private market innovations that 
have created efficiencies, controlled costs, and improved quality. It has done 
little to improve health outcomes and does not adequately reimburse providers. 
Its burdensome rules and unwieldy regulations do not allow states to 
effectively manage their programs.70 
Pence claimed that HIP offered a better potential vehicle for expanding 
Medicaid, and that his State would not consider expanding Medicaid unless 
CMS first agreed to an extension of HIP, which was set to expire in 2013.71 
CMS summarily denied the request less than two weeks later, due to the 
State’s failure to comply with the ACA’s public notice and comment 
provisions.72 Notwithstanding the unpromising start, the Pence Administration 
and CMS ultimately reached an agreement in January 2015—Indiana would 
participate in the ACA’s Medicaid expansion, but would do so using HIP as a 
vehicle.73 
HIP 2.0’s provisions and requirements are complex. HIP 2.0 offers 
benchmark coverage through managed care organizations (MCO)74 to non-
disabled, non-elderly adults earning 133% FPL or less,75 and who are not 
 
 68. Typically, the waiver covered only about five percent of the eligible, uninsured 
population at any given time. See, e.g., Laura D. Hermer & Merle Lenihan, The Future of 
Medicaid Supplemental Payments: Can They Promote Patient-Centered Care?, 102 KY. L.J. 287, 
308, 313 (2013-2014). 
 69. Letter from Michael Pence, Governor of Ind., to Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y of Health & 
Human Servs. (Feb. 13, 2013), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/ 
By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/in/Healthy-Indiana-Plan-HIP/in-healthy-indiana-plan-ext-
req-ltr-02132013.pdf [hereinafter Letter from Pence to Sebelius]. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Letter from Diane T. Gerrits, Dir., Div. of State Demonstrations & Waivers, to Patricia 
Casanova, Dir., Office of Medicaid Policy & Planning (Feb. 25, 2013), https://www.medicaid. 
gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/in/Healthy-Indi 
ana-Plan-HIP/in-healthy-indiana-plan-ext-deny-ltr-02252013.pdf. 
 73. HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN, supra note 25, at 2. 
 74. For a summary of the plans available under HIP 2.0, see generally Healthy Ind. Plan, 
Health Plan Summary, IN. GOV., http://www.in.gov/fssa/hip/files/IN-HIP-PlanChartSmmry_41 
MAX_ 031015.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2016). 
 75. 138% with the five percent income disregard. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) 
(2012). 
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otherwise eligible for Medicaid.76 It differs from the original HIP in a number 
of respects. Unlike the original HIP, HIP 2.0 has no annual or lifetime limits on 
coverage, and also offers broader coverage—though at a lower reimbursement 
rate than the original HIP.77 There are three different types of plans under HIP 
2.0. HIP Basic covers all “essential health benefits,” including but not limited 
to primary care, inpatient and outpatient medical care, hospice care, home 
health care, maternal care, mental and behavioral health care, and 
pharmaceuticals.78 HIP Plus covers the essential health benefits, plus vision 
and dental care.79 HIP Link is not coverage per se, but rather contributes up to 
$4,000 toward the premium and cost-sharing amounts owed by HIP-eligible 
individuals who have employer-sponsored coverage rather than HIP.80 HIP 
does not cover non-emergency medical transportation, and beneficiaries who 
make non-emergent use of emergency department services are charged a 
higher co-payment.81 
Coverage under HIP 2.0 is modeled on a private, high-deductible health 
plan, just as it was under the original HIP.82 Accordingly, the coverage comes 
with a health savings account.83 This account, called, as it was under the 
original HIP, a Personal Wellness and Responsibility, or “POWER” account, is 
funded by contributions from both the state and the beneficiary.84 
Beneficiaries—no matter how impoverished—must contribute two percent of 
their income85 each month to their POWER account; the state contributes the 
 
 76. HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN 2.0, supra note 44, at 8. Pregnant women who choose to stay 
in HIP during their pregnancy may remain in HIP rather than being transferred to the state’s 
traditional Medicaid program. Id. at 9. 
 77. IND. FAMILY & SOC. SERVS. ADMIN., HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN 2.0: INTRODUCTION, 
PLAN OPTIONS, COST SHARING, AND BENEFITS 32 (2015), http://www.in.gov/fssa/hip/files/HIP_2 
_0_Training_-_Introduction_Plans_Cost-Sharing_Benefits.pdf; IND. FAMILY & SOC. SERVS. 
ADMIN., HIP 2.0 APPROVED! (2016), http://www.in.gov/fssa/hip/files/HIP_PPT_2.0_2.16. 
15.pdf. 
 78. Healthy Indiana Plan FAQ, IN.GOV, http://www.in.gov/fssa/hip/2452.htm (last visited 
Mar. 24, 2016). For a list of Indiana’s essential health benefits through 2016, see generally 
Indiana EHB Benchmark Plan, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms. 
gov/CCIIO/Resources/Data-Resources/Downloads/Updated-Indiana-Benchmark-Summary.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 24, 2016). 
 79. Healthy Indiana Plan FAQ, supra note 78. 
 80. HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN 2.0, supra note 44, at 15-16. 
 81. Id. at 14, 27. 
 82. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN AND THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 1 
(2013), https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/8529-healthy-indiana-plan-
and-the-affordable-care-act1.pdf. 
 83. Id. 
 84. HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN 2.0, supra note 44, at 17. 
 85. HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN, supra note 25, at 20. Beneficiaries earning less than five 
percent FPL must only contribute one dollar per month. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVS., WAIVER LIST: HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN (HIP) 2.0 1 (2015), https://www.medicaid.gov/ 
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remainder.86 When a beneficiary who makes such contributions uses covered 
health care services, he must pay for them using a card issued in connection 
with the account.87 If a beneficiary uses more than $2,500—the maximum 
amount in the POWER account—then the state will cover the remainder, other 
than the twenty-five dollar copayment a beneficiary might owe due to non-
emergent use of an emergency department.88 If a beneficiary uses less than the 
$2,500 in covered health care services, then she may roll over a portion of that 
amount to the next year and thereby reduce the contributions she must make to 
the account, provided she has never been disenrolled from HIP during a 
coverage year.89 Regardless of the amount in a beneficiary’s POWER account, 
the MCO must pay for a covered service.90 However, if a beneficiary is 
terminated from the HIP for nonpayment of POWER account contributions, 
and has used more health care than the value of his POWER account at the 
time he received the service, he must repay the MCO up to the full value of the 
contributions he would have owed that year.91 Any amount such a beneficiary 
fails to pay is treated as debt.92 
Rather than commencing on the date the individual applies for coverage, as 
in traditional Medicaid, eligibility starts on the date an individual makes her 
first payment to her POWER account, and is not retroactive.93 Beneficiaries 
 
Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/in/Healthy-Indiana-
Plan-2/in-healthy-indiana-plan-support-20-ca.pdf [hereinafter INDIANA WAIVER LIST]. 
 86. HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN 2.0, supra note 44, at 24. 
 87. Id. at 21-22. Preventive services are covered by the state at first dollar, rather than from 
the POWER account. Id. at 22. 
 88. Id. at 27. The state is randomizing 5,000 HIP beneficiaries into a group that owes only 
eight dollars per non-emergent use of the emergency department and will compare the emergency 
department use of the two groups. Id. at 28. 
 89. Id. at 22-24. If the beneficiary is enrolled in HIP Basic, then he must obtain at least one 
age and gender appropriate preventive service in order to roll over any applicable amount in his 
POWER account. Id. at 23. If a beneficiary is enrolled in HIP Plus, then she can have her 
contribution doubled by obtaining such preventive care. Id. 
 90. Id. at 26. 
 91. HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN 2.0, supra note 44, at 20, 24-25. Individuals who fail to pay 
due to a “qualifying event” are exempt from this requirement. Id.  “Qualifying events” include 
obtaining and then losing private coverage; having a loss of income after disqualification due to 
increased income; taking up residence in another state; being a victim of a declared disaster; 
being a domestic violence victim; and being or becoming medically frail. Id. 
 92. Id. at 17. 
 93. Id. at 10-11. If an individual who is not required to make POWER account payments as a 
condition of continued eligibility fails to make their first payment within sixty days, then their 
eligibility for HIP starts on the first day of the first month in which the sixty day period ends. Id. 
If an individual is screened for eligibility at a federally-qualified health center, a rural health 
center, a community mental health center, or a public health department and is found to be 
eligible for HIP, then, unlike other beneficiaries, the individual will be deemed presumptively 
eligible at that time for a minimum of sixty days. Id. 
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earning more than 100% FPL are required to make such contributions.94 If they 
fail to do so for more than sixty days, then their coverage is revoked and they 
become ineligible for further coverage under HIP for six months.95 
Beneficiaries earning less than 100% FPL must make contributions to their 
POWER account if they want HIP Plus; otherwise, they are only eligible for 
HIP Basic.96 Additionally, they become responsible for cost-sharing 
payments.97 
As of July 31, 2015, only 27,828 individuals with incomes over 100% FPL 
enrolled in HIP 2.0; the remainder of the 264,004 enrollees earned less than 
100% FPL.98 As the second HIP quarterly report observes, the low number of 
individuals subject to the mandatory POWER account contribution may be due 
to their enrollment, instead, in Marketplace coverage.99 This is possible, as 
individuals buying a Silver Marketplace plan would only be responsible for 
paying two percent of their income toward premiums, and up to six percent of 
out-of-pocket costs.100 Individuals enrolled in HIP, on the other hand, are 
responsible for paying only up to a maximum of five percent of their income, 
an amount they will not likely reach, provided they diligently pay two percent 
of their income monthly toward their POWER account.101 While costs would 
accordingly be higher in perhaps most cases for Marketplace coverage, it is 
possible that some individuals would prefer to pay those costs rather than be 
subject to the requirements and welfare trappings of HIP 2.0. The “Gateway to 
Work” program is one such “welfare” feature of HIP 2.0.102 It offers no-cost 
assistance to HIP beneficiaries in finding work.103 Although participation in 
the program is voluntary,104 and although the CMS approval letter expressly 
 
 94. Id. at 18. 
 95. Id. at 17, 24. 
 96. HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN 2.0, supra note 44, at 17. Rules for medically-frail individuals 
and low-income individuals ages nineteen and twenty differ slightly, but neither group may be 
disenrolled for failing to pay into their POWER account. Id. at 24-25. 
 97. Id. at 17. 
 98. IND. FAMILY & SOC. SERVS. ADMIN., HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN DEMONSTRATION: 
SECTION 1115 QUARTERLY REPORT tbl. 1 (2015), www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-
Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/in/Healthy-Indiana-Plan-2/in-healthy-indiana-
plan-support-20-qtrly-rpt-may-july-10082015.pdf [hereinafter HIP 2D QUARTERLY REPORT]. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1401, 124 Stat. 119, 
311 (2010) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 36B (2012)). 
 101. HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN 2.0, supra note 44, at 25. Only three percent of HIP 
beneficiaries earning more than 100% FPL were disenrolled due to a failure to pay their POWER 
account contribution. HIP 2D QUARTERLY REPORT, supra note 98. 
 102. Gateway to Work, HEALTHY IND. PLAN, www.in.gov/fssa/hip/2466.htm (last visited Feb. 
26, 2016). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2016] ON THE EXPANSION OF “WELFARE” AND “HEALTH” UNDER MEDICAID 253 
noted that the program was “outside” of the HIP demonstration,105 all HIP 
beneficiaries who are either unemployed or who work less than twenty hours 
per week are automatically referred to the program.106 
HIP’s POWER accounts are the program’s cornerstone.107 Indiana expects 
that contributing regularly to a POWER account will “encourage personal 
responsibility, improve healthy behaviors, and develop cost conscious 
consumer behaviors among all beneficiaries.”108 POWER accounts and the 
requirements associated with them are expressly intended to sharply 
distinguish HIP from Medicaid. As an advisor to Governor Pence claimed, 
“[i]t’s that we require people to make contributions. That really flies in the face 
of the entitlement thing.”109 And indeed, the mere requirement of contribution, 
at least for those earning more than 100% FPL, does appear to be the main 
point of the POWER account. There does not appear to be any serious belief 
that the contributions will in fact substantially defray state costs.110 They do 
not count toward the federal match.111 Their connection with healthy behaviors 
is tenuous at best.112 And they certainly do not improve the financial status of 
 
 105. Letter from Marilyn Tavenner, Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to Joseph 
Moser, Dir., Ind. Family & Soc. Servs. Admin. (Jan. 27, 2015), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medi 
caid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/in/Healthy-Indiana-Plan-2/ 
in-healthy-indiana-plan-support-20-ca.pdf. 
 106. Gateway to Work, supra note 102. 
 107. See, e.g., Letter from Senator Richard Lugar et al., to Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y Health & 
Human Servs. (Nov. 4, 2011), www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-
Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/in/in-healthy-indiana-plan-ar.pdf (noting that “the POWER 
account was designed to be the cornerstone of HIP”). 
 108. HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN 2.0, supra note 44, at 2. 
 109. J. K. Wall, Pence Still Angling to Use Healthy Indiana Plan to Expand Medicaid, IND. 
BUS. J. (Feb. 23, 2013), www.ibj.com/articles/39757-pence-still-angling-to-use-healthy-indiana-
plan-to-expand-medicaid. HIP 2.0 also offers, for beneficiaries who choose to use it, job training 
and employment-related services. See, e.g., HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN 2.0, supra note 44, at 3. 
While the employment features are voluntary under HIP 2.0, the state has sought to include them 
among the objectives of the waiver. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., HEALTHY 
INDIANA PLAN, DRAFT EVALUATION DESIGN 1 (2015), www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-
Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/in/Healthy-Indiana-Plan-2/in-healthy-
indiana-plan-support-20-draft-eval-design-10292015.pdf [hereinafter HIP DRAFT EVALUATION]. 
 110. See ROBERT M. DAMLER & CHRISTINE MYTELKA, MILLIMAN CLIENT REPORT: 1115 
WAIVER – HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN EXPANSION PROPOSAL 7 (2014), www.in.gov/fssa/hip/files/ 
15-1115_Waiver_Expansion_-_2015.pdf (referring to Table 4). 
 111. HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN 2.0, supra note 44, at 40. 
 112. See, e.g., HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN DEMONSTRATION, 1115 ANNUAL REPORT 50, 64 
(2014), http://in.gov/fssa/hip/files/2012_HIP_Annual_Report.pdf [hereinafter HEALTHY INDIANA 
ANNUAL REPORT 2012]. While claiming that HIP copays caused HIP members to make more 
judicious use of the emergency room than traditional Medicaid beneficiaries, the report observed 
that “Survey respondents were also asked whether the [emergency room (ER)] copayment policy 
ever caused them to decide not to go to the emergency room. Less than seven percent of members 
reported that they avoided the ER because of the copayment.” Id. 
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the poor and near-poor Indiana residents who must make contributions. 
Nevertheless, the waiver’s special terms and conditions describe the purpose 
given above for POWER accounts, among HIP 2.0’s other goals as 
“promot[ing] the objectives of Title XIX [Medicaid].”113 
How well has HIP 2.0 been accomplishing these goals? Unfortunately, 
there is not yet much publicly available information on which to base any 
assessment. Data from the original waiver shows that individuals who received 
HIP were largely grateful to have any health insurance at all, quite likely 
because in most cases their alternative was to have none.114 HIP members were 
surveyed on their opinions of the program and whether it changed their health 
habits, and demographic and economic data were collected, but the data—or at 
least the portion of it that was released publicly—yielded few if any results that 
would suggest that HIP yields better coverage and care outcomes for low-
income populations.115 Finally, per member per month costs were greater for 
the HIP population, overall, than for the traditional Medicaid population, 
notwithstanding HIP’s POWER account that was intended to encourage 
“responsible” use of health care services.116 As for the present waiver, while it 
has been in effect for nearly a year, Indiana is still negotiating with CMS over 
 
 113. HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN 2.0, supra note 44, at 2. Other goals include promoting 
“increased access to health care services,” “increasing quality of care and efficiency of the health 
care delivery system,” and “promoting private market coverage and family coverage options 
through HIP Link to reduce network and provider fragmentation within families.” Id. Indiana is 
testing the following as a condition of the waiver: 
Whether a monthly payment obligation linked to a POWER account will result in more 
efficient use of health care services; whether the incentives established in this 
demonstration for beneficiaries to obtain preventive services and engage in healthy 
behaviors will result in better health outcomes and lower overall health care costs; and 
whether POWER account contributions in lieu of cost sharing for individuals participating 
in the HIP Plus Plan will affect enrollment, utilization, and the use of preventive and other 
services by beneficiaries. 
Id. 
 114. See, e.g., HEALTHY INDIANA ANNUAL REPORT 2012, supra note 112, at 91 (reporting 
that, according to an unreleased 2013 Mathematica survey, seventy-six percent of HIP 
beneficiaries were “very satisfied” with their coverage). 
 115. See generally id. (reporting demographic data, POWER account contribution and 
rollover information, emergency department usage, use of preventive care services, chronic 
disease prevalence, and HIP beneficiary opinion, but failing to compare the data to one or more 
relevant control groups). 
 116. See, e.g., IND. OFFICE OF MEDICAID POLICY & PLANNING, QUARTERLY FINANCIAL 
REVIEW 6, 13 (Dec. 2011) (showing that, while Hoosier Healthwise (traditional Medicaid) adults 
receiving risk-based managed care cost an average of $293.48/month from July 2011 to 
December 2011, HIP adults cost $2,486.71 per month. Even when one removes the highest-cost 
HIP population (those in the Enhanced Services Plan), costs still were about 140% greater for 
caretaker adults and 290% greater for non-caretaker adults in HIP than for comparable adults in 
Hoosier Healthwise). 
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the evaluation design for the program.117 CMS, under the Obama 
Administration, has standardized key features of Section 1115 waiver 
applications, and has issued regulations making the evaluation component of 
waivers more stringent than they were previously.118 Hence, the evaluation of 
HIP 2.0 may ultimately yield more useful data, which will actually be made 
public, than the first HIP waiver did.119 
This will depend, however, on the study design CMS ultimately accepts. 
Indiana’s proposed evaluation design for HIP offers few comparisons between 
HIP and traditional Medicaid. Rather, to the extent that comparisons are made 
at all, most of the comparisons are between HIP 2.0 beneficiaries and those 
who are eligible but do not enroll, HIP 2.0 and HIP beneficiaries, or different 
classes of HIP 2.0 beneficiaries.120 This is problematic. The baseline 
hypothesis of HIP 2.0 does not concern, for example, an assertion that the 
second iteration contains programmatic improvements over the first, or that 
HIP 2.0 beneficiaries are better off as compared to the uninsured. Rather, it is 
that HIP 2.0—an ostensibly “consumer-driven” plan—is superior to Medicaid 
qua “entitlement program.”121 As such, it would seem that, if Indiana truly 
wants to prove its point, it would seek to compare HIP 2.0 as against either 
traditional Medicaid, with respect to its coverage of congruent beneficiaries, or 
as against the standard ACA Medicaid expansion as carried out in similar 
states wherever possible and relevant. 
Yet that is neither what Indiana proposes, nor what CMS appears to be 
seeking. On the one hand, this may have something to do with difficulties in 
crafting a congruent in-state comparison. Because of the way the waiver is 
structured, HIP 2.0 now covers most non-disabled, non-elderly adults who 
used to be eligible for Medicaid in Indiana.122 One needs to make apples-to-
apples comparisons, and without a sufficiently numerically robust comparison 
group of non-disabled, non-elderly adults in traditional Medicaid in Indiana, 
 
 117. See, e.g., Letter from Andrea J. Casart, Acting Dir., Div. of Medicaid Expansion 
Demonstrations, to Joseph Moser, Medicaid Dir., Ind. Family & Soc. Servs. Admin. (Oct. 29, 
2015), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/11 
15/downloads/in/Healthy-Indiana-Plan-2/in-healthy-indiana-plan-support-20-draft-eval-design-
10292015.pdf (noting that CMS has concerns about Indiana’s proposed study design, and 
suggesting revision). 
 118. See CMS, State Medicaid Letter, supra note 33 and accompanying text; see also 
SECTION 1115 DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM TEMPLATE, supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 119. Hermer & Lenihan, supra note 68, at 310 (noting some of the studies and data from the 
original HIP waiver were never publicly released, though in some cases ostensible findings from 
them were cited by Indiana’s Family and Social Services Administration). 
 120. See HIP DRAFT EVALUATION, supra note 109, at 26-30, 34-38, 40-41, 45-47, 50, 52-53. 
 121. See, e.g., Niki Kelly, HIP 2.0 Receives Federal Funding, J. GAZETTE (Jan. 25, 2015), 
www.journalgazette.net/news/local/indiana/HIP-2-0-receives-federal-approval-4712263; see also 
J.K. Wall, supra note 109. 
 122. See HIP DRAFT EVALUATION, supra note 109, at 4. 
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comparing outcomes in HIP 2.0 against those in traditional Medicaid makes 
little sense. On the other hand, parents and caretakers who are eligible for 
Medicaid under the old cash welfare limits are still enrolled in traditional 
Medicaid in Indiana.123 Additionally, many states opted for the standard 
Medicaid expansion under the ACA.124 It could be useful to know how 
features such as health outcomes, health care use, perceived health status, and 
ease of benefit use compare between these two populations and the lowest-
income HIP 2.0 beneficiaries.125 
Really, what we need from Indiana and the other waiver expansion states is 
data that would help prove or disprove the assertion that providing lower-
income beneficiaries with personal responsibility requirements and the 
trappings of private plans in fact furthers the objectives of Medicaid. Those 
objectives, as provided by CMS, are to: 
• increase and strengthen overall coverage of low-income individuals in the 
state; 
• increase access to, stabilize, and strengthen providers and provider networks 
available to serve Medicaid and low-income populations in the state; 
• improve health outcomes for Medicaid and other low-income populations in 
the state; or 
• increase the efficiency and quality of care for Medicaid and other low-
income populations through initiatives to transform service delivery 
networks.126 
One suspects that CMS granted Indiana’s and other waiver expansion states’ 
waiver requests on the theory that coverage expansion testing nearly any 
theory that arguably fits within the Secretary’s waiver authority is better than 
no coverage expansion at all. If one compares Indiana’s demonstration against 
the prospect of no coverage expansion at all, then indeed the proposal 
“increase[s] and strengthen[s] overall coverage of low-income individuals in 
the state,” and will likely also further others of CMS’s stated objectives.127 
Because the coverage expansion is optional, courtesy of NFIB v. Sebelius, 
it is difficult to argue that CMS got the comparison group wrong here, at least 
 
 123. See 42 C.F.R. § 435.110(c) (2015) (enumerating the cash welfare limits); see also HIP 
DRAFT EVALUATION, supra note 109, at 10. 
 124. See Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion, KAISER FAM. FOUND., http://kff. 
org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-activity-around-expanding-medicaid-under-the-affordable-
care-act/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2016) (compiling the list of states that have opted for the standard 
Medicaid expansion under the ACA). 
 125. See HIP DRAFT EVALUATION, supra note 109 (exploring how Indiana proposes in some 
cases to compare HIP 2.0 to expansion populations in other states, but not to the extent one might 
expect for a robust comparison). 
 126. Section 1115 Demonstrations, supra note 32. 
 127. Id. 
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with respect to doing the right thing for Indiana’s expansion population. But in 
terms of doing what is right for Medicaid, granting the waiver does not appear 
to be the right move. How does requiring non-nominal cost-sharing from low-
income beneficiaries, or designing the benefit plan to mimic a high-deductible 
health plan, or delaying the start of coverage in most cases until the beneficiary 
makes a POWER account contribution, or disenrolling and imposing a six-
month lockout on a beneficiary for non-payment of required contributions, or 
referring beneficiaries to employment services “increase and strengthen overall 
coverage of low-income individuals in the state,”128 or otherwise further 
Medicaid’s goals? On the contrary, if one assumes that having stable access to 
health care is a good,129 then it would appear to weaken them. Ample evidence 
already exists that imposing cost-sharing requirements on low-income 
individuals has a deleterious effect on both their coverage and care.130 It is not 
obvious, then, how Indiana’s demonstration, among the other studies that 
 
 128. Id. 
 129. See, e.g., Benjamin D. Sommers et al., Mortality and Access to Care Among Adults after 
State Medicaid Expansions, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1025, 1028-29 (2012) (finding a significant 
reduction in all-cause mortality, a significant reduction in uninsurance, a significant decline in 
delayed care, and a significant increase in rates of “excellent” or “very good” health following 
state Medicaid expansions); Helen Levy & David Meltzer, What Do We Really Know About 
Whether Health Insurance Affects Health? 33-34 (Dec. 20, 2001) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with the University of Chicago) (summarizing studies evaluating the effect of health 
insurance on health, and finding that all but one suggest a positive effect); Joseph J. Sudano & 
David W. Baker, Intermittent Lack of Health Insurance Coverage and Use of Preventive Services, 
93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 130, 133-34 (2003) (finding that, the greater the number of intermittent 
coverage gaps a person has, the less likely they are to use preventive care services when covered). 
The ACA has been improving the stability of coverage, even over only the first year of its 
implementation. See, e.g., Adele Shartzer & Sharon K. Long, Quick Take: More Adults Have 
Stable Health Insurance Coverage as ACA Implementation Proceeds, Urban Institute Health 
Reform Monitoring Survey, URB. INST. HEALTH POL’Y CTR. (Dec. 2, 2015), http://hrms.urban. 
org/quicktakes/More-Adults-Have-Stable-Health-Insurance-Coverage-as-ACA-Implementation-
Proceeds.html; SARA R. COLLINS ET AL., THE RISE IN HEALTH CARE COVERAGE AND 
AFFORDABILITY SINCE HEALTH REFORM TOOK EFFECT 4-6 (David Blumenthal et al. eds., 2015) 
(finding a decline in the number of adults reporting that they did not receive medical care because 
of cost, and that uninsured adults reported difficulty in obtaining care due to cost at twice the rate 
as insured adults). 
 130. Lauren Snyder and Robin Rudowitz, in their review of the relevant literature, found in 
summary, among other findings, that premiums often impose a barrier to coverage for low-
income individuals; cost-sharing imposes substantial barriers to obtaining necessary care for low-
income individuals and can cause them to delay or omit treatment, whether necessary or 
unnecessary, as well as sometimes substitute lower-cost treatment for higher-cost services; the 
effect of cost-sharing on non-emergent use of emergency department services is mixed; and that 
savings from cost-sharing accrue more from a decline in utilization rather than an increase in 
patient revenue. LAUREN SNYDER & ROBIN RUDOWITZ, PREMIUMS AND COST-SHARING IN 
MEDICAID: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 3, 6-7, 11 (2013), https://kaiserfamilyfoundation. 
files.wordpress.com/2013/02/8417-premiums-and-cost-sharing-in-medicaid.pdf. 
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require increased premium and/or cost-sharing from low-income beneficiaries, 
could add anything sufficiently useful to what is already known on the subject 
to warrant waiver approval.131 
There is no evidence that the purpose of Medicaid is to teach low-income 
Americans the virtues of personal responsibility, whether they need such 
education or not. Nor is there any evidence that the purpose of Medicaid is to 
inculcate a respect for the free market, or small government, or any other 
political or economic theory for that matter. Rather, Medicaid is intended to 
extend financial access to a robust package of health services to populations 
that typically lack such access via other means.132 Should a state wish to “test” 
a demonstration project that clearly, based on available evidence, either is 
known not to further such a purpose, or otherwise falls outside of the 
Secretary’s statutory authority to grant, the Secretary should deny the proposal. 
V.  THE OREGON HEALTH PLAN 
Oregon’s Section 1115 waiver—the Oregon Health Plan (OHP)—presents 
a very different case from Indiana’s. The original waiver began in 1994.133 
Oregon initially sought to achieve universal health coverage in the state, but 
when that reform fell through, it instead focused on extending Medicaid 
coverage to all state residents earning 100% FPL or less.134 Because budget 
neutrality required the state to find sufficient savings elsewhere in the program 
to cover the expansion population it wanted to cover, Oregon proposed to 
ration the services it offered through Medicaid.135 It developed, and over the 
years has refined and revised, a list of health condition and treatment pairs, 
ranked in order of priority based on clinical and cost effectiveness.136 
Depending on available funding, the program draws a line on the list after a 
 
 131. Sidney Watson argues persuasively that, even where provisions in demonstration 
proposals technically fall within the authority of the Secretary to grant, it may be an abuse of 
discretion to grant a waiver purporting to study an issue where prior research has consistently 
yielded a known result. Sidney D. Watson, Out of the Black Box and Into the Light: Using 
Section 1115 Medicaid Waivers to Implement the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid Expansion, 15 
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L., & ETHICS 213, 218, 226 (2015). 
 132. Hermer, Medicaid, supra note 37, at 419. 
 133. OREGON HEALTH PLAN, supra note 59, at 5. 
 134. Jonathan Oberlander, Health Reform Interrupted: The Unraveling of the Oregon Health 
Plan, 26 HEALTH AFF. w96, w97 (2007). 
 135. Id. at w96. Nevertheless, in the current iteration of its waiver, Oregon received a $1.1 
million dollar investment from HHS. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-239, 
MEDICAID DEMONSTRATIONS: APPROVAL CRITERIA AND DOCUMENTATION NEED TO SHOW 
HOW SPENDING FURTHERS MEDICAID OBJECTIONS 17 (2015) [hereinafter GAO MEDICAID 
DEMONSTRATIONS]. 
 136. OREGON HEALTH PLAN, supra note 59, at 17; see Thomas Bodenheimer, The Oregon 
Health Plan: Lessons for the Nation, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 720, 720 (1997). 
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particular condition-treatment pair.137 Conditions falling below that line are not 
reimbursed; those falling above it are.138 This feature of the OHP remains 
today.139 
Under the current iteration of the OHP, all Medicaid beneficiaries other 
than expansion adults (non-disabled, non-elderly, non-caretaker individuals 
between eighteen and sixty-four years of age, earning up to 133% FPL) and 
women eligible through the Breast and Cervical Cancer Treatment Program140 
receive OHP Plus.141 OHP Plus provides all approved services on the 
prioritized list, EPSDT services for individuals under age twenty-one, services 
provided by “non-traditional health workers,”142 person-centered primary care 
home services, mental health facility services, long term care services, 
intermediate care facility services for individuals with mental retardation, and 
Medicare premium payments and cost-sharing.143 Expansion adults receive the 
Alternative Benefit Plan, which consists of essential health benefits on the 
prioritized list.144 
These features of the OHP, however, are largely old news. The innovative 
features have to do with the delivery system reforms that the State started in 
2012.145 Oregon’s goals for the current demonstration project are to “reduce 
the trend in statewide Medicaid per capita spending” while “improving access 
and quality.”146 Toward those ends, rather than continuing to deliver and pay 
 
 137. Bodenheimer, supra note 136, at 723. 
 138. Id. at 653-54. If a treatment is not funded, providers are directed to inform patients of 
appropriate treatments, even if not funded, and to write a prescription for such treatment where 
relevant. OREGON HEALTH PLAN, supra note 59, at 17-18. 
 139. OREGON HEALTH PLAN, supra note 59, at 17. The prioritized list of services, current as 
of October 1, 2015, draws the line below: 
Condition: ACQUIRED PTOSIS AND OTHER EYELID DISORDERS WITH VISION 
IMPAIRMENT (See Guideline Notes 64, 65, 130). Treatment: PTOSIS REPAIR. 
HEALTH EVIDENCE REVIEW COMM’N, PRIORITIZED LIST OF HEALTH SERVICES 115 (2015), 
http://www.oregon.gov/oha/herc/PrioritizedList/10-1-2015%20Prioritized%20List%20of%20 
Health%20Services.pdf. 
 140. OREGON HEALTH PLAN, supra note 59, at 16. This population receives coverage for 
relevant treatment for breast and/or cervical cancer or precancerous lesions for which they are 
otherwise uninsured. See id. at 20. 
 141. Id. at 16, 20. Oregon covers pregnant women up to 185% FPL, children ages zero to one 
up to 185% FPL, children one to eighteen up to 133% FPL, the aged, blind, and disabled at 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) eligibility (seventy-four percent FPL), women in the Breast 
and Cervical Cancer Treatment Program up to 250% FPL, and expansion adults up to 133% FPL. 
See id. at Attachment D. 
 142. Id. at 16. These individuals include community health workers, peer wellness specialists, 
patient navigators, and doulas. Id. at 175. 
 143. Id. at 16-17. 
 144. Id. at 19. 
 145. OREGON HEALTH PLAN, supra note 59, at 22. 
 146. Id. at 174. 
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for care in ways that have become standard in many state Medicaid programs, 
Oregon is developing Care Coordination Organizations (CCO) through which 
all care is delivered to its Medicaid population.147 CCOs resemble state-
created, geographically demarcated accountable care organizations.148 They 
are community-based managed care organizations that are paid to deliver 
primary care-based, full-spectrum care to a regional Medicaid population via a 
global budget consisting of capitated per member per month payments and a 
separate per member per month payment based on other services.149 A portion 
of the CCO’s reimbursement is withheld and disbursed based on whether the 
CCO met certain quality and access metrics.150 Providers who share in the 
financial risk constitute a majority on each CCO’s governing board, and they 
are given input through a community advisory council.151 
While CCOs primarily deliver medical care, their services go beyond 
traditional health care offerings.152 Community health workers and others 
provide training, support, and case management services to certain mentally ill 
and substance abusing populations.153 Non-traditional health workers provide 
home visits for newborns and their mothers.154 Some job training and support 
services for certain at-risk populations are provided.155 
CCOs are also charged with partnering with relevant agencies and 
organizations. Partnering arrangements include, in particular, working with the 
state Public Health Division to address social contributors to chronic 
diseases.156 CCOs are specifically charged under the waiver with developing 
“Transformation Plans.”157 These Plans address “social conditions beyond the 
immediate control of a single individual or Coordinated Care Organization” 
that constitute “systemic barriers and root causes of poor health outcomes,” 
such as “persistent mental illness, addiction, homelessness, unemployment, 
 
 147. Id. at 7. 
 148. Or. Health Policy Bd., Coordinated care: the Oregon difference, OREGON.GOV, 
http://www.oregon.gov/oha/OHPB/pages/health-reform/ccos.aspx (last visited Mar. 6, 2016). 
 149. OREGON HEALTH PLAN, supra note 59, at 25, 31; see also OR. CTR. FOR PUB. POLICY, 
UPDATED ABCS OF CCOS: THE BASICS OF HOW OREGON AIMS TO TRANSFORM HEALTH CARE 
1, 2 (2012), http://www.ocpp.org/media/uploads/pdf/2012/04/fs20120430CCOBasicsUpdated 
fnl.pdf; Lauren Broffman & Kristin Brown, Year Two: Capturing the Evolution of Oregon’s 
CCOs, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (July 15, 2015), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/07/15/year-two-cap 
turing-the-evolution-of-oregons-ccos/. 
 150. OREGON HEALTH PLAN, supra note 59, at 33-34. The Special Terms and Conditions 
contain detailed specifications regarding the relevant metrics. Id. at 34-37, 179-245. 
 151. Id. at 25. 
 152. Id. at 25, 130. 
 153. Id. at 130-35. 
 154. Id. at 132. 
 155. OREGON HEALTH PLAN, supra note 59, at 135. 
 156. Id. at 194-95. 
 157. Id. at 183-84. 
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lack of transportation and lack of quality education,” through “the community 
needs assessment, community health improvement plan, the Community 
Advisory Council and collaboration with state and local public health agencies 
and community partners.”158 In this and other goals, such as the elimination of 
health care disparities, CCOs receive assistance from state entities that offer 
training to CCOs and disseminate best practices developed at local levels.159 
Oregon is not alone in using Medicaid dollars for non-traditional services. 
However, the State does stand out in being one of the only states that has, for 
the most part, successfully justified to the satisfaction of the GAO that its 
coverage of such services using Medicaid funds is reasonable under federal 
requirements.160 While the GAO admittedly did not look at the substance 
behind the justifications, substantial research supports transforming health care 
delivery systems from ones that reward increased care, regardless of quality or 
outcomes, to ones that reward more efficient achievement of improved 
population health outcomes and higher quality of care.161 
 
 158. Id. at 195. The state asked CCOs to submit Transformation Plans addressing the 
following eight areas: 
• Developing and implementing a health care delivery model that integrates mental 
health and physical health care and addictions. This plan must specifically address 
the needs of individuals with severe and persistent mental illness. 
• Continuing implementation and development of Patient-Centered Primary Care 
Home (PCPCH). 
• Implementing consistent alternative payment methodologies that align payment 
with health outcomes. 
• Preparing a strategy for developing Contractor’s Community Health Assessment 
(CHA) and adopting an annual Community Health Improvement Plan (CHIP) 
consistent with 2012 Oregon Laws, Chapter 8 (Enrolled SB 1580), Section 13. 
• Developing electronic health records; health information exchange; and 
meaningful use. 
• Assuring communications, outreach, Member engagement, and services are 
tailored to cultural, health literacy, and linguistic needs. 
• Assuring provider network and staff ability to meet cultural diverse needs of 
community (cultural competence training, provider composition reflects Member 
diversity, nontraditional health care workers composition reflects Member 
diversity). 
• Developing a quality improvement plan focused on eliminating racial, ethnic and 
linguistic disparities in access, quality of care, experience of care, and outcomes. 
Or. Health Auth., Transformation Plan Key Component Guidance and Technical Assistance, 
OREGON.GOV, https://cco.health.oregon.gov/Pages/transformationplan.aspx (last visited Mar. 6, 
2016). 
 159. OREGON HEALTH PLAN, supra note 59, at 195-98. 
 160. GAO MEDICAID DEMONSTRATIONS, supra note 135, at 28-34. 
 161. See, e.g., Scott Buris, From Health Care Law to the Social Determinants of Health: A 
Public Health Law Research Perspective, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1650 (2011); regarding health 
care delivery, see Donald M. Berwick et al., The Triple Aim: Care, Health, and Cost, 27 HEALTH 
AFF. 759, 761-62 (2008); MAUREEN BISOGNANO & CHARLES KENNEY, PURSUING THE TRIPLE 
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To date, CCOs appear to be making some positive differences in the health 
of the populations they serve, as well as decreasing utilization of unnecessary 
services. Not all outcomes were good. For example, utilization of some 
preventive care services, such as Pap and chlamydia tests, declined, as did, 
children’s access to primary care providers.162 Nevertheless, reported access to 
care improved slightly in 2014.163 All-cause readmission rates declined from 
12.8% in 2013 to 11.4% in 2014.164 Emergency department use declined from 
50.5 per 1,000 member months in 2013 to 47.3 in 2014.165 Avoidable 
emergency department use declined by almost half from 2011 to 2014.166 More 
physicians reported seeing Medicaid patients, and patient satisfaction scores 
improved.167 Both inpatient and outpatient costs have decreased since 2011.168 
At the same time, most CCOs are receiving 100% or more of their quality pool 
payments, and all CCOs met at least ten of their seventeen quality 
improvement targets.169 
An initiative such as Oregon’s could easily flounder in many different 
respects. For example, the state could merely be paying lip service to the triple 
aim of cost containment, better care, and improved population health. The state 
could support the program’s goals, but fail to provide adequate centralized 
guidance, support, and funding to local CCOs in the latter’s pursuit of them. 
Local providers could fail to trust each other and/or the state program 
adequately to work together efficiently and responsively. So far, however, it 
appears that none of these issues have yet materialized to a sufficiently 
substantial degree to put the program in jeopardy. As Lauren Broffman and 
Kristin Brown observe, CCOs realized the state had a vested interest in their 
success, and started to act accordingly.170 Providers’ intrinsic interests in 
“working with the others to figure out how to do things better” are also having 
a positive effect, in conjunction with other drivers, particularly financial 
ones.171 It remains to be seen, though, whether the program will build 
 
AIM: SEVEN INNOVATORS SHOW THE WAY TO BETTER CARE, BETTER HEALTH, AND LOWER 
COSTS 4-5 (Jossey-Bass, 1st ed. 2012); John W. Whittington et al., Pursuing the Triple Aim: The 
First 7 Years, 93 MILBANK Q. 263, 296-98 (2015). 
 162. Or. Health Auth., Oregon’s Health System Transformation: 2014 Performance Report 
26, 28-32, 35 (June 24, 2015), http://www.oregon.gov/oha/Metrics/Documents/2014%20Final% 
20Report%20-%20June%202015.pdf. 
 163. Id. at 9. 
 164. Id. at 16. 
 165. Id. at 18. 
 166. Id. at 20. 
 167. Or. Health Auth., supra note 162, at 92-95. 
 168. Id. at 111-12. 
 169. Id. at 4, 6. 
 170. Broffman & Brown, supra note 149. 
 171. Id. 
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momentum while managing to avoid or successfully manage the many 
potential pitfalls that may arise in the process. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Medicaid waivers granted under Section 1115 of the Social Security Act 
are supposed to be reserved only for testing “any experimental, pilot, or 
demonstration project which, in the judgment of the Secretary, is likely to 
assist in promoting the objectives of [Medicaid].”172 Those objectives have 
been clearly stated by CMS. Yet CMS has granted, and continues to grant, 
waivers for demonstration projects that either do not need to be tested because 
the outcome is already known, or that do not promote the stated objectives of 
Medicaid, such as Indiana’s HIP waiver and others like it. 
Medicaid is a program intended to provide health care to individuals who 
would otherwise likely lack it.173 It is in the business of health promotion and 
preservation. Oregon’s waiver is among those that seek to further such goals. 
Indiana’s, however, is not. Its punitively-structured, non cost-effective benefit 
package does not seek to test better, more efficient and effective ways to 
provide access to care and promotion of health. Rather, it is more likely that it 
is intended, as suggested by some comments made by those in the Pence 
Administration,174 to point the way toward dismantling Medicaid, and perhaps 
providing something else in its place. States ought not to play games with the 
lives and health of their most impoverished residents. At the same time, CMS 
ought not to play games with the nature of Medicaid. CMS should more 
strictly adhere to the purposes of Medicaid in deciding whether to grant 
Section 1115 Medicaid waivers. 
  
 
 172. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1315(a) (2014) (codifying Section 1115 of the Social Security Act). 
 173. See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(10) (2012). 
 174. Letter from Pence to Sebelius, supra note 69. 
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